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INTRODUCTION 
The development of rural financial markets in developing 
countries during the past couple of decades has been dominated by 
a preoccupation of governments to expand the supply of loans to 
farmers. Policies have been implemented to push cheap loans into 
rural areas, and to assure lenders of adequate funds for such 
loans. Funds have frequently been provided to lenders through 
rediscount facilities of the central bank (often through conces-
sionally-priced funds from international donors). Regulations 
have also been introduced to require financial institutions to 
either lend directly to farmers or make deposits with specialized 
farm lenders. Too frequently, deposit mobilization has been the 
forgotten half of financial intermediation (Vogel). 
Three factors have contributed to a fundamental rethinking 
of this approach to rural finance. First, the failures and 
distortions of the cheap rural credit strategy have been amply 
documented (Adams, Graham and Von Pischke)!/. Second, domestic 
resource mobilization is becoming more urgent out of necessity. 
Many countries face greater difficulty today in obtaining cheap 
foreign funds because they are already heavily indebted, commer-
cial lenders are wary of increasing their exposure in many 
developing countries, and the international agencies don't have 
as abundant funds as previously (Abbott; Fry). Third, the once 
pessimistic view that rural people are too poor to save has been 
challenged. It is argued that low rural savings rates are often 
due more to inappropriate policies than to poverty (Adams). 
The awakening of interest in rural savings has sparked 
interest in rural deposit mobilization. A number of recent 
studies have been conducted on the need for and the impact of 
greater rural deposit mobilization on rural financial institu-
tions. Several important experiments have been and are being 
conducted to test the response of rural households to various 
techniques used by financial institutions to attract deposits. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize some of the recent 
developments in this heretofore forgotten half of financial 
intermediation. The presentation is organized to address six 
questions: Why was rural deposit mobilization forgotten? Why is 
deposit mobilization important for rural financial institutions? 
What is the potential for mobilizing rural deposits? What 
factors contribute to rural deposit mobilization? What is the 
outcome of recent experimental projects to mobilize rural 
deposits? What are the key remaining issues to be addressed in 
rural deposit mobilization? 
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WHY WAS RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION FORGOTTEN? 
Many of the developments in rural finance in developing 
countries during the past two decades have been aimed largely at 
increasing agricultural lending, referred to as the supply 
lending approach to financial development. Interestingly, Brazil 
has pursued this developmental strategy as aggressively as any 
country and the resulting agricultural credit to GDP ratios at 
various times have been amongst the highest observed in any 
developing country (Araujo and Meyer). 
The following summary characterizes many of the policies and 
programs designed for agricultural credit, and many of these 
features are also found in small or microenterprise programs. 
1. Increase the supply of funds available for lending to the 
priority sector (small farm or nonfarm enterprises) through: 
a. loan portfolio quotas or targets for existing lenders, 
b. the creation of specialized financial institutions to 
work only with the priority sector(s), 
c. grants and subsidies for non-financial institutions 
(ministries, departments, institutes, NGOs, PVOs), 
d. central bank rediscount programs, often funded by 
donors, 
e. mandatory placement of bank and/or public sector 
deposits in specialized lending institutions, and 
f. nationalization of banks that fail to meet social 
objectives. 
2. Reduce the interest rate on loans made to the priority 
sector through: 
a. interest rate ceilings on loans which set the lowest 
rates for the smallest/poorest borrowers, 
b. low interest rates charged by the central bank on 
refinance funds, 
c. encouraging banks to cross-subsidize by charging higher 
rates to non-priority borrowers in compensation for low 
rates to priority borrowers, and 
d. direct government interest subsidies to lenders. 
3. Reduce lending risks and costs through: 
a. detailed targeting of loans including specifications 
about production practices and input use required of 
borrowers, 
b. crop and loan guarantee programs, 
c. creation of joint liability through lending to groups 
of borrowers, and 
d. technical assistance to lenders to help improve 
institutional efficiency. 
\ 
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Three factors help explain why rural deposit mobilization 
was not stressed as a source of a least part of the funds 
employed in these credit programs. First, it is frequently 
assumed that poor rural households can not or will not save. 
More will be said about this later. Second, subsidized lending 
rates were a cornerstone of many programs, justified either as a 
means to encourage farmers to borrow to make socially desireable 
investments or as an attempt to improve rural income distribution 
~I. However, since interest rates were set low for loans, 
interest rates paid on deposits also had to be low unless 
subsidies were to be provided to savers. Low deposit rates then 
discouraged rural deposits. Third, large amounts of foreign 
grants and loans were available to finance agricultural credit at 
subsidized rates. These funds were available to lenders at low 
interest rates so there was little incentive for them to mobilize 
rural deposits, especially if they expected that rural deposit 
accounts would be small and expensive to administer. In fact, 
some specialized agencies, such as agricultural development 
banks, were prevented by regulations from accepting deposits even 
though they had a wide network of branches. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the strategy of subsidized agricultural credit 
precluded a major role for rural deposits. 
WHY IS DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IMPORTANT FOR RURAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS? 
There are several reasons why the supply lending strategy 
undermined the viability of rural financial institutions, and why 
strong rural deposit mobilization may help to strengthen these 
institutions.~/ First, the supposedly cheap funds available from 
the central bank refinance window and international agencies may 
not be as cheep as they appear because of the heavy documentation 
and reporting requirements for such funds. For example, lending 
costs in Honduras for a commercial bank were only 3 percent, 
while they were more than 8 percent for the Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank which relied heavily on external funds. Furthermore in 
the commercial banks, lending costs were almost 8 percent when 
using donor funds but ranged from 1 to 6 percent for loans made 
with the bank's own funds (Cuevas and Graham). 
Second, financial institutions may achieve economies of 
scope when they engage in the multiple functions of lending and 
deposit mobilization rather than just lending alone. The reasons 
may be two-fold. First, there may be some efficiencies to be 
exploited when a financial institution has a branch network for 
lending but mobilizes no deposits. This was the case with the 
Agricultural Development Bank in the Dominican Republic, which 
began accepting deposits with few additional workers in the 
existing branches (Gonzalez-Vega (1984)). Secondly, there may be 
informational economies when an institution has previous deposit 
history with a loan applicant. The deposit experience may 
provide information on an applicant's financial management, cash 
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flow, savings habits and wealth which contribute to better 
lending decisions. 
A third factor is that when financial institutions rely upon 
external funds and only participate in targeted lending programs, 
they must follow the rules and regulations provided on authorized 
sizes and types of loans, amount to lend each borrower, disburse-
ment and repayment schedules and collateral requirements. When 
lenders mobilize their own resources, they can develop loan 
programs that conform more closely to their own lending standards 
and that more adequately supply the needs of local farmers and 
communities. They may be able to more easily reject poor credit 
risks and resist the political pressures that often enter into 
loan allocation when credit is rationed due to excess demand. 
Fourth, repayment performance may be superior on loans made 
through mobilized funds for several additional reasons!/, If 
loan funds are drawn from savings made by members of the com-
munity, the willingness of the borrowers to repay is often 
dramatically increased. The use of local savings, thus, promotes 
borrower responsibility (Deguefe). Another reason is that the 
attitudes of lenders towards careful borrower screening and loan 
recovery may change when the funds lent are obtained from 
depositors who some day expect to withdraw the funds. Special-
ized lending institutions in particular often spend relatively 
less effort on loan collection than lending because institutional 
incentives are given for reaching lending targets (Graham and 
Cuevas; Nyanin). When lenders take little action to collect, 
borrowers react with lax repayment. A case study in Nepal showed 
that collection efforts were more important in explaining loan 
repayment than farm income and other variables predicted to be 
important (Maharjan, Loohawenchit and Meyer). 
For reasons of costs, independence in credit allocation and 
good loan recovery, there are, therefore, reasons to believe that 
mobilizing deposits sets in motion a set of incentives that help 
an institution to achieve and maintain viability. The entire 
pattern of institutional objectives and operations is different 
when an institution is dominated by depositors who demand prudent 
lending so their deposits are secure than in a borrower dominated 
institution where the overriding concern is to get cheap loans 
(Poyo). 
WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL FOR MOBILIZING RURAL DEPOSITS?2/ 
If rural deposit mobilization can help improve the long-term 
viability of rural financial institutions, the logical question 
is what is the potential for mobilizing rural savings in the form 
of deposits? There are at least five reasons to believe that 
past assumptions have been far too pessimistic about the amount 
of savings that are available in rural areas. First, all 
households save no matter how poor, even if in small amounts for 
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short periods of time. Abstention from consumption is normal and 
necessary for survival even if the interval before consumption is 
fairly short (Von Pischke). Second, farmers save automatically. 
When production and consumption cycles are not synchronized, 
farmers regularly store some produce for consumption until the 
next harvest. Alternatively, they may choose to sell their 
harvest, pay past debts or expand consumption, and borrow before 
the next harvest (Bouman). Third, rural households are heteroge-
neous. Rich households exist alongside poor ones; some house-
holds experience surpluses just when others face deficits, so the 
possibility exists for financial intermediaries to mobilize short 
and long-term deposits (Meyer and Alicbusan). Fourth, while some 
rural areas are growing at slow rates and barely keep up with 
population growth, other areas are experiencing rapid changes in 
enterprises and technology. Rapid income growth due to tech-
nological change can increase rural consumption, savings and 
investment (Mellor). Indian data show that savings/investment 
ratios in better-irrigated, more rapidly innovating regions were 
much better, up to 3 to 15 times the all-Indian average (Krishna 
and Raychaudhuri; Sigh, Gupta and Singh). Fifth, foreign 
remittances offer new savings potential for several countries. 
Many offshore workers come from rural areas and show a propensity 
for low consumption levels and large scale transfers of liquidity 
to their country of origin (Gourvez). Some countries have been 
fairly successful at mobilizing these remittances, but much 
remains to be done. A recent study in Pakistan showed that much 
of the U.S. $ 2 Billion received in annual remittances went to 
rural areas, but only 1.5 percent were channelled into financial 
assets (Jetha, Akhtar and Rao). 
What emerges from the recent studies is that the potential 
for rural savings is much greater than previously assumed. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the fact that rural deposits are 
relatively small is due more to bad policies and lack of ap-
propriate institutions than to low rural income and poor savings 
habits of rural households. 
WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION? 
The demand for deposits by rural households is influenced by 
a variety of economic and noneconomic factors. The political and 
economic instability that has existed in many countries obvious-
ly discourages many economic activities. The degree of monetiza-
tion of the rural economy effects the choice of assets held by a 
household. Lack of confidence in institutions generally and 
banks specifically thwarts all types of financial activities. 
Literacy and economic sophistication will effect how rural people 
obtain and utilize new information. All these factors can 
influence rural deposits but there is little that governments can 
do about them in the short-run. 
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There are other factors, however, over which governments 
have more control and can influence even in the short-run. Rural 
income is one of these. Almost all analysts agree that an 
increase in income should lead to a rise in demand for savings 
generally and deposits specifically. The discrimination that 
exists against agriculture in many countries reduces income and, 
therefore, the ability of rural households to hold deposits. 
There is considerable debate over the influence of interest 
rates on savings. An increase in interest rates may stimulate 
savings by making current consumption expensive in terms of 
future consumption (substitution effect), or may lower savings by 
reducing the amount of present savings necessary for a given 
level of future consumption (income effect). The available 
evidence, based largely on Asian and Latin American experience, 
suggest the substitution effect is more important, but not 
overwhelmingly so (Lanyi and Saracoglu). The important issue for 
financial intermediation in LDCs is the relationship between 
rates of interest paid on deposits and savings in financial 
forms. Advocates for higher rates argue that peasants are 
economically rational in their financial affairs, and even poor 
households need and benefit from attractive deposit and savings 
services. They feel that countries (such as Taiwan and South 
Korea) have mobilized surprisingly large amounts of rural savings 
when deposit rates were changed substantially, while rural 
savings have been depressed in other countries because real 
deposit rates have ben highly negative due to high inflation 
rates (Benoit; Mittendorf). Additional evidence on rural deposit 
potential is found in the experimental projects for rural savings 
institutions that successfully mobilized large amounts of 
deposits when interest rates were raised and other incentives 
were given to savers. Information on these projects is presented 
below. 
Recently more attention has been given to transaction costs 
because of their influence on the net return obtained from any 
given interest rate. Transaction costs for rural savers include 
the explicit costs of photographs, passbooks, travel costs, and 
other cash costs of depositing and withdrawing savings. Implicit 
costs include traveling and waiting time to make transactions. 
Often times the implicit costs are high so the proximity of 
deposit-taking institutions may be the most important factor 
affecting access and transactions costs. 
A final important factor expected to affect rural deposits 
is the linkage between savings and lending. Many analysts 
believe that an important reason for rural household saving is 
the possibility of eventually getting a loan. This implies that 
institutions should link savings mobilization with lending, but 
in practice many rural financial institutions are single func-
tion. 
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Although there have been many studies of aggregate rural 
savings, there are relatively few studies that specifically test 
the importance of these factors in explaining rural deposits. 
One recent study attempted to explain rural deposits in India, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka using the basic model (Srinivasan 
and Meyer): 
D = F (Y,r,i,B) 
where D = nominal value of rural deposits, 
Y = agricultural GDP, 
r = nominal interest rate, 
i = rate of inflation, and 
B = number of bank branches/offices in rural areas. 
It was expected that agricultural GDP and number of branches 
would be positively related to deposits because all four count-
ries had experienced nominal and real increases in agricultural 
GDP, and actively pursued the spread of rural bank offices. The 
expected sign for the interest rate variable was positive. Real 
deposit rates of interest were negative in India and Pakistan 
during several of the years studied, but Nepal and Sri Lanka 
liberalized their interest rate policies leading to positive real 
deposit rates. 
The model was fitted to pooled time-series cross-section 
data covering the twelve years 1970-1981, used generalized least-
square (GLS) regression in double-log form. Two empirical models 
were tested. The first was specified as: 
( 1 } lnD 
where D 
y 
r-i 
and B 
Di 
Ui 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
a 0 + a 11nY + a 2 lnB + a 31n(r-i) + b 1o1 
b2D2 + b3D3 + C31U1 + C32U2 + C33U3 
per capita real rural (demand and savings) deposits, 
per capita agricultural GDP at constant factor cost, 
real rate of interest on twelve-month time deposits, 
number of bank branches/offices per thousand inhabit-
ants in rural areas, 
1, i = 1,2,3 for Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, 
respectively, O otherwise. India was selected as the 
country of reference. 
DilnB, Di = dummy variable for the respective countries 
This model implies that households react directly to real 
interest rates. An alternative formulation permitted a differen-
tial response to changes in nominal rates and inflation. The 
response lag to changes in nominal rates might be shorter than 
the lag in response to changes in inflation because the latter 
are filtered through the process of expectation formulation. 
Therefore, the second model was specified as follows: 
(2) ln D = a 0 + a 11nY + a 21nB + a 41nr 
+ a 51ni + b 1o1 + b 2o2 + b 3o3 
+ C31U1 + C32U2 + C33U3 
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The sign for the coefficient of nominal interest rate was 
expected to be positive, while the sign for the inflation 
variable was expected to be negative. 
Table 1 presents the results which were considered reason-
able given the limitations of the data. The elasticities for 
branches and real deposit rates were greater than one. A 10 
percent increase in the number of rural branches is associated 
with a 13 percent increase in rural deposits, while a similar 
increase in rural deposit rate is associated with a 17 percent 
increase in deposits. The income variable was less elastic with 
a value of 0.5. When the branching coefficient was adjusted for 
country interaction, there was a tendency for lower branch 
elasticity to be associated with higher bank density. This is 
logical since the impact of additional branches should be lower 
when bank density is higher. An F-test revealed that the two 
models were not statistically different suggesting that rural 
depositors respond to real rather than nominal interest rates and 
do not formulate separate expectations of nominal interest rates 
and inflation. 
Beta coefficients were calculated to evaluate the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables. They showed that 
changes in transaction costs represented by branch density were 
relatively more important than changes in agricultural GDP and 
real interest rates in explaining the variation in rural deposits 
confirming recent arguments that transaction costs require more 
attention in understanding rural deposits. 
Another recent study analyzed district level bank deposits 
in Bangladesh (Khalily, Meyer and Hushak). It made the important 
argument that not only are deposits influenced by access to 
deposit-taking institutions but bank branches are also influenced 
by the level of actual and potential deposits in a market area. 
A simultaneous equation model was tested of the form: 
(3) ln(DINT/POP) = A + a 11nPYP + a 2 1nPYT + a 3 1nBF + a 4 1nRDV + 
+ a 5 tnL + a 6 1nP + u1 
( 4 ) lnBF 
where, 
DINT/POP = 
PYP = 
PYT = 
BF = 
RDV = 
L = 
p = 
PCR = 
U1, U2 = 
= B + b 1 1nPYP + b 21nRDV + b 3 1nP + b 4 1nPCR + 
+ b 51n(DINT/POPJ + u2 
District per capita interest bearing deposits, 
District per capita permanent income, 
District per capita transitory income, 
Number of district rural bank branches per 
capita, 
District per capita index of roads and vehicles, 
District literacy rate, 
District rural inf lat ion, 
District per capita volume of rural loans 
outstanding, and 
error terms 
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Equation 3 represents a demand for deposits function while 
equation 4 represents the supply of deposit services through 
expansion of bank branches. PCR was excluded from equation 3, 
and L and PYT were excluded from equation 4. Two-stage least 
squares (2 SLS) were used to estimate the models. 
The roads and vehicles index was included to capture the 
dimension of transaction costs which is represented by ease of 
travel. This is important in a country where travel cost and 
time are great. It was specified as: 
RDVj 
where, 
RDV· RD~ 
TAJ 
POPj TV~ J 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
x 100 
Weighted index of roads and vehicles in jth district, 
Mileage of roads in jth district, 
Total geographical area of jth district, 
Size of population in thousands of jth district, and 
Total number of vehicles in jth district. 
The results of double-log estimation are shown in Tables 2 
and 3. The second stage statistics report the direct effect of 
the explanatory variables on deposits (Table 2) and bank branches 
(Table 3). The reduced form coefficients show the total effects 
(direct and indirect) of the variables on deposits and bank 
branches. 
The significant cross coefficients for the bank branch and 
interest bearing deposits variables in the structural equations 
support the hypothesis of two-way casualty between deposits and 
bank branches. The elasticity of interest bearing deposits with 
respect to bank branches estimated at 0.985 was significant at 
the 0.05 level, while the elasticity of bank branches with 
respect to interest bearing deposits estimated at 0.158 was 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
The results confirm that as expected transitory income was 
more important than permanent income in influencing deposits. 
Transaction costs represented by bank branches and roads and 
vehicles have an important effect on demand for deposits along 
with income and literacy. Deposits, permanent income and 
inflation affect number of bank branches. 
These results show that rural deposits conform to economic 
theory. Households choose a portfolio of investments and demand 
more deposits when given appropriate incentives. The expansion 
of the banking network in rural areas emerges as a particularly 
important incentive to households through its impact on reducing 
transaction costs. The location of a bank branch in a market 
area undoubtedly contributes to households becoming accustomed to 
dealing with formal institutions and developing the banking 
habit. 
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WHAT IS THE OUTCOME OF RECENT EXPERIMENTAL PR03ECTS TO MOBILIZE 
RURAL DEPOSITS? 
A number of experimental rural deposit mobilization projects 
have been conducted in developing countries in recent years. 
They have often been designed by USAID to help financial institu-
tions mobilize more of their own resources and rely less on funds 
from the central bank and other external sources. The results of 
some of these projects are summarized here. 
The first pilot savings mobilization project which inspired 
many of the others was undertaken in Peru (Vogel). It was 
conducted with the Banco Nacional para las Cooperativas (BANCOOP) 
during 1979-1981. BANCOOP is a second-level cooperative that 
receives deposits and makes loans. It deals with the general 
public in addition to cooperatives. It had been reasonably 
successful as an urban-based operation and wanted to expand into 
rural areas. 
In less than two years, deposit mobilization in selected 
pilot offices and BANCOOP generally far surpassed the project's 
targets. Interviews with depositors revealed that revisions in 
the interest rate structure, confidence in the financial institu-
tion and good service, and effective savings mobilization 
campaigns contributed to BANCOOP's success. The latter included 
heavy publicity, prizes and raffles. Differences were noted 
between cooperative members and nonmembers in their reasons for 
depositing. For members, the possibility of obtaining a loan 
predominated, followed by confidence in the institution. For 
nonmembers, more weight was placed on good service, location, 
hours of operation and interest payments. Publicity was impor-
tant in helping depositors learn about BANCOOP, and many looked 
favorably on the raffles. 
The deposit mobilization experiments conducted by credit 
unions in Honduras and the Dominican Republic followed the spirit 
of the BANCOOP project. In both countries, a small group of 
credit unions were selected to receive technical assistance in 
interest rate reforms, savings mobilization, and loan management. 
After just two years of operations in Honduras, the five par-
ticipating credit unions had mobilized substantially more share 
accounts, passbook accounts, and time deposits than nonpar-
ticipating credit unions (Poyo). The loan portfolios of the five 
credit unions increased by 25 percent in just two years while it 
actually declined in the nonparticipant group. Aside from 
providing resources for lending, the participating credit unions 
were able to repay part of their relatively more expensive 
external debt. 
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Likewise, in just two years of operation in 1984 and 1985, 
the four participating credit unions in the Dominican Republic 
increased their share capital by a third to three quarters and 
achieved even faster growth in passbook accounts and term 
deposits. While outstanding loans rose by factors of two to ten, 
the level of delinquent loans fell, in one credit union from 70 
to 10 percent. As in the Honduras case, the success of these 
credit unions was attributed to good service, reduced transaction 
costs and the possibility of getting a loan by developing a 
banking relationship. When it was realized that the credit 
unions had sufficient liquidity to grant new loans, delinquent 
borrowers were more inclined to pay their outstanding loans 
(Gonzalez-Vega (1986)). 
Part of the Dominican Republic project involved opening 
savings windows in Banco Agricola, the public agricultural 
development bank. It had 31 branches scattered around the 
country but until 1983 served only as a lending window for 
external funds, either foreign or central bank. It was authori-
zed to mobilize deposits, but had little incentive to do so. Its 
lending activities were unstable; when external funds were 
abundant it expanded capacity only to be followed by periods of 
contraction. As a result it was not a reliable and permanent 
credit source to farmers. The initial success of opening deposit 
windows in a few experimental branches in mid 1983 was so great 
that there was great pressure to immediately expand the program. 
By October 1986, the 30 participating branches had opened about 
37,000 accounts, most of which were savings accounts. Total 
deposits approached RD $10 million. Although this amount was 
only about 10 percent of the loans outstanding, it represented an 
important step away from dependency on external funds (Gonzalez-
Vega (1986)). 
The Bangladesh experiment represented an attempt to test the 
cost effectiveness of alternative techniques to mobilize rural 
deposits (Ahmed and Khaled). The project involved the Agrani 
Bank, one of the country's nationalized commercial banks that was 
involved during the past decade in the government's efforts to 
expand rural branches and agricultural lending. It mobilized 
deposits as part of its regular banking activities. The project 
involved a comparison of three models, each employed in two 
different regions. The first was labeled the tangible incentive 
model and provided special incentives to the depositors for 
opening or adding to an existing acount. The second was a 
marketing model which involved the hiring of two temporary bank 
staff in each branch to promote deposits through door to door 
contacts with rural households. The third was an employee 
incentive model which provided cash bonuses to regular bank 
employees for mobilizing deposits. 
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All three models succeeded in mobilizing additional deposits 
in both the rich and poor regions where they were tested over a 
three month period. Furthermore, the new Agrani Bank deposits 
did not appear to result from disintermediation from neighboring 
competing banks. The increase in deposits ranged from one to 
over eight percent of the branch's existing deposit base. Over 
half of the new accounts were opened by women who usually are not 
very active economically in this society. Savings accounts with 
check writing facilities were more popular than either demand or 
fixed deposit accounts. Most accounts were only U.S. $3-4 in 
size, but surprisingly most accounts increased in size over the 
short life of the project and the number of deposits made per 
account was generally far greater than the number of withdrawals. 
Overall, the tangible incentive model provided the highest 
incrimental increase in income for the bank because of its lower 
cost of deposit mobilization. But all three models demonstrated 
the bank's ability to mobilize additional deposits in a very poor 
country with an annual per capita income of approximately $130. 
The experiments conducted in these countries show that rural 
deposits can be mobilized even from low income households if the 
financial institutions provide the appropriate incentives and 
instruments. Special savings campaigns can be useful in publi-
cizing opportunities to save and a wide variety of techniques are 
available to financial institutions that want to aggressively 
attract deposits. 
WHAT ARE THE KEY ISSUES REMAINING IN RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION? 
Rural deposit mobilization can and should be an important 
part of the strategy to develop rural financial markets. Rural 
deposits can be mobilized, they can provide some of the funds 
used in rural lending, and reduce dependence on external funds. 
Financial institutions can be stregthened by building a strand 
rural deposit base. There are several issues, however, that must 
be addressed as countries attempt to improve their rural deposit 
performance. Some concern national policy issues while others 
concern the management of financial institutions. 
1. Mix of rural financial institutions. No single 
financial institution is likely to be optimum for all developing 
countries, or all regions within a country. A large multi-
service commercial bank may be appropriate in a high income rural 
area where complex financial services are demanded. A small 
credit union or informal savings group may be more appropriate in 
a sparsely settled low income region. Some institutions may be 
encouraged to provide retail financial services while others 
specialize in wholesaling. The appropriate mix of institutions 
must be developed for each country considering its unique 
circumstances. 
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2. Competition. Expanding multifunctional rural institu-
tions opens up possibilities for increased competition and 
greater efficiency in the provision of financial services. A 
trade-off may exist, however, if economies of scale exist in 
banking. A wide network of small banks or branches will facilit-
ate deposit mobilization, but efficient lending may imply larger 
units where better expertise on loan evaluation can be developed. 
Much more must be known about the economies of rural banking 
before firm recommendations can be made about this general issue. 
3. Inflation. Many countries, especially in Latin 
America, are experiencing double and triple digit inflation. It 
is extremely difficult for any type of financial institution to 
thrive in this situation because the optimum investment portfolio 
may include little money and financial assets. The management of 
financial institutions in highly inflationary environments faces 
a serious challenge in developing interest rate policies that 
will provide depositors with expectations of attractive returns 
on their savings while at the same time setting lending interest 
rates that will cover costs and that borrowers can pay. 
4. Management of financial institutions. Perhaps the 
biggest single obstacle to developing a deposit-based rural 
financial system is human capital. One advantage of the supply-
lending strategy was that it could be implemented with relatively 
limited trained manpower. Decision making was concentrated at 
the top and local bank staff essentially followed regulations. 
In some extreme cases, central banks developed voluminous credit 
manuals to guide lending. Liability management simply involved 
requesting funds from the central bank, and repaying them when 
loans were paid. Liability management is more complicated and 
risky when personal deposits are the main source of funds for 
lending. Little is known about the fluctuations in potential 
deposit base due to seasonality and the business cycle, and how 
these affect optimal loan portfolios in rural areas. More 
attention is needed to developing appropriate risk reducing 
mechanisms for unit financial institutions which have assets and 
liabilities concentrated in a few households/firms in a small 
geographic area. The quality of bank management and employees 
must be improved so they can handle the burden required in 
mobilizing and managing deposits. 
5. Regulation and supervision. Much of the recent rural 
finance literature has concentrated on analyzing the negative 
aspects of policies and regulations that support the traditional 
approach to rural financial markets. It might be naively assumed 
that deregulation is the complete answer. There are areas, 
however, which require more rather than less regulation or at 
least regulation concerning other issues. Examples include 
limits or ceilings on the amount of deposits obtained from and 
loans made to a single customer to prevent portfolio concentra-
tion. Controls are needed on insider transactions conducted with 
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the management and staff of the financial institutions. Loans to 
insiders contribute to portfolio concentration, frequently 
increase loan delinquency and demoralize depositors with worthy 
projects but who are crowded out of getting loans. 
Another specific issue of regulation concerns reserve 
requirements. High reserve requirements are sometimes rational-
ized to protect institutions but in practice they are often a way 
to tax the financial sector. Alternative ways must be found to 
collect taxes so that reserve requirements do not discourage 
deposit mobilization. 
The capacity to adequately regulate and inspect financial 
institutions has not kept pace with their expansion and develop-
ment in many countries. Unless this capacity is increased 
several fold, corruption and other abuses will continue, deposit-
ors and investors will be inadequately protected, and accounting 
practices will continue to overstate the soundness of financial 
institutions. 
6. Cost and risk reducing innovations. Many of the 
innovations that financial institutions have undertaken in recent 
years have been designed to avoid regulations. There is a great 
need for innovations that reduce costs and risks so that institu-
tions are motivated to voluntarily expand rural financial 
services. The cost of managing many small deposit accounts is an 
important concern for successful deposit mobilization. Some 
experiments are being conducted with microcomputers which may 
produce some new cost-effective methods. Mobile banks and mini-
bank outlets are being introduced in some countries to reduce 
costs. Deposit insurance is being considered in some countries 
to reduce depositor risk and improve preferences for holding 
financial assets. These innovations can contribute to making 
rural deposits an economically feasible source of funds for 
financial institutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Prospects are better today than at any time in the past two 
decades for developing viable rural financial institutions. 
Privatization and deregulation are underway around the world. 
Market incentives are increasingly taking the place of plans, 
targets and quotas. The weaknesses of the supply-lending rural 
finance model have been exposed. Neither governments nor donors 
have the resources to sustain past subsidies. The trend is 
towards greater rural deposit mobilization and financial inter-
mediation rather than simply pushing cheap agricultural loans. 
There is ample evidence that savings exist in rural areas. 
The challenge is to find ways to mobilize these savings in the 
form of deposits in financial institutions. Interest rates, 
transaction costs, the quality of banking services and educa-
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tional programs have emerged as key determinants affecting 
household demand for deposits. 
There is a danger, however, that some of the rural deposit 
mobilization efforts recently conducted and being proposed today 
suffer from some of the same simple minded advocacy that charac-
terized subsidized credit projects in the past. Mobilizing 
deposits, safeguarding them for depositors, and using them 
efficiently for loans and investments by financial institutions 
is not a simple matter. It is filled with risks for the deposi-
tor, for the financial institutions and for the government. The 
experience that is being gained from the experimental projects 
underway will help provide information about how to reduce these 
risks. Stronger more viable self-sustaining financial institu-
tions should emerge because of these experiments. 
·' 
Parameter 
(Independent 
Variable) 
ao (intercept) 
al (lnY) 
a2 (lnB) 
a3 (ln(r-i)) 
a4 On( r)) 
as ( ln( i)) 
bl (Dl) 
b2 (D2) 
b3 (D3) 
c31 (Ul = D1 lnB) 
c32 (U2= D2lnB) 
c33 (U3= D3lnB) 
R2 
F-Value 
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TABLE 1. -- GLS ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF 
THE DEPOSIT FUNCTIONa/ 
E9uation (1) Equation (2) 
Standard-
ized 
Estimate t-ratiob/ Estimate Estimate t-ratiob/ 
-3.405 -7.855** -3.250 -7.440** 
0.528 5.438** 0.200 0.620 ' 4.309** 
1.306 18.815** 1. 991 1.303 19. 277** 
1. 721 3.077** 0.056 
0.056 0. 580 
-0.012 -0.056 
-4.243 -8.818** -1.776 -4.215 -9.048** 
-0.965 -1.165 -0.403 -0.915 -1.044 
-3.385 -9.320** -1.416 -3.316 -9.383** 
-0.592 -4.709** -0.851 -0.587 -4.829** 
-0.239 -1.387 -0.486 -0.22Z -1.233 
-0.513 -1.745* -0.180 -0.407 -1.249 
0.877 0.872 
38.383** 33 .115** 
a/ N=48. D1, Dz, and D3, are dlllllmy variables where D1 = 1 for 
Sri Lanka, 0 otherwise; Dz = 1 for Nepal, 0 otherwise; and 
D3 = 1 for Pakistan and 0 otherwise. 
b/ Levels of Significance: ** = 0.01; * = 0.10. 
Standard-
ized 
Estimate 
0.235 
1.986 
0.021 
-0.000 
-1. 764 
-0.383 
-1. 388 
-0.843 
-0.45Z 
-0.143 
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TABLE 2 
Estimated Parameters of the lbuble IDg 
Interest Bear!~ Deposit Function 
Pernment Incane llYpothesis Absolute Incane llYpothesis 
Reduced Fonn Second Stage Red11Ced Fom Second Stage 
Parameter F.quation statistics Indirect Equation statistics 
(variable) T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) Effect al· CT-Ratio) CT-Ratio) 
Intercept -1.686*** 6.06*** -2.243** 10.992** 
(-.932) ( .884) (-1.328) (1.428) 
~ 
(PYP) .595* .057 .538 
(3.571) (.083) 
(PYT) 2.783** 2.40** .383 
(1.225) (1.260) 
(L) .216 .185*** .031 .286*** .169 
( .595) ( .849) ( .811) (. 758) 
(P) -.104 .058 -.162 .009 .'lln* 
(-.560) ( .230) ( .061) (1. 760) 
(BF) .985* 1.626** 
(1.785) (1.586) 
(RJV) .278* .219* .059 .263 .167* 
(4.138) (2.333) (3.948) (2.194) 
(PCR) .119 .194*** 
( .623) '(1.134) 
(PV) .565* -.341 
(3.386) (-.590) 
F-Ratio 7.1.!¥ 11.91~ 8.1s!Y 16.as!r' 
R-Square .684 .706 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .10 level. 
***Significant at .20 level. ti Indirect effects are estineted as the difference bebam the reduced fonn and the 
second stage coefficients. 
~ Significant at .0001 level 
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TABLE 3 
F.stimated Parameters of 1be lbuble Ing 
Bank Branch Function 
Permanent Incaie Hvoothesis 
Reduced Form 
Parameter Equation 
(Variable} (T-Ratio} 
Intercept -8.166* 
(11.06) 
(PYP) .568* 
(8.351) 
(M) .402 
( .381) 
(P'i) 
(L) .038 
( .254) 
(P) -.17* 
(-2.254) 
(RDV) .063* 
(2.309) 
(PCR) .126* 
(1.617) 
(DINf/PCP} 
F-Ratio 12.~ 
R-Square 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .10 level. 
***Significant at .20 level. 
Second stage 
statistics Indirect 
(T-Ratio} Effects/ 
-7.893* 
(-12.762) 
.478* .09 
(3.096) 
-.155* -.015 
(-3.591) 
.022 .041 
( .294) 
.107** .019 
(1.487) 
.158** 
(1.624) 
26.'ll.W 
.794 
Absolute Incaoo Hypothesis 
Reduced Fonn Second Stage 
Equation statistics 
{T-Ratiol CT-Ratio) 
-8.14* -7.577* 
(-11.762) (-10.959) 
.557* .415* 
(8.145) (1.864) 
.072 
( .483) 
-.171* -.173* 
(-2.936) (-4.208) 
.059* -.rm 
(2.178) (-.061) 
.119* .071*** 
(1. 702) ( .864) 
.252** 
(1.679) 
14.7~ 29.1~ 
.811 
~ Indirect effects are estimated as the difference between the reduced fonn am the 
second stage coefficients. 
~Significant at .0001 level 
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1. Many of the chapters in the book along with some new 
chapters are now available in the Spanish version by Adams, 
Gonzalez-Vega and Von Pischke. 
2. Adams and Meyer discuss the ways that low interest rates can 
actually worsen income distribution. 
3. Unlike in many other developing countries, Brazil is one of 
the few countries where the rapid expansion of agricultural 
credit has not undermined or destroyed the financial 
institutions. One important difference is that, for reasons 
not entirely clear, Brazilian financial institutions seem to 
have avoided the high levels of delinquency and default of 
agricultural loans encountered in many other countries. 
4. A fuller discussion of this point can be found in Meyer 
(1985). 
5. This section draws heavily from Meyer (1985). 
• 
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